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Filling the First Amendment Gap: Can Gideons Get 
Away with In-School Bible Distribution by Exploiting 
the Play in the Joints Between the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses? 
Bryan K. Clark∗ 
The First Amendment seems to leave little doubt about the role of 
government in religion: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”1 
But from that one short sentence has come decades of disagreement. 
Supreme Court opinions extending back to the 1960s have construed 
the First Amendment as a “unified command that government not 
give unique consideration to religion.”2 However, there has been 
dissatisfaction in recent years with the Court’s categorical analysis of 
the First Amendment because it fails to account for the contours of 
the Amendment’s multi-dimensional issues.3  
Despite these concerns, the First Amendment jurisprudence 
surrounding the distribution of religious materials in public schools 
was surprisingly clear for many years. Courts uniformly held that 
such a distribution would violate the Establishment Clause of the 
 
 ∗ J.D. (2008), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law. Many thanks to my 
friends at the ACLU of Eastern Missouri for inspiring this discussion and sharing their thoughts 
along the way. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2. F. Phillip Manns Jr., Finding the “Free Play” Between the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses, 71 TENN. L. REV. 657, 657 (2005) (“Government violates the 
Establishment Clause when it uniquely aids religion by granting an exclusive benefit to 
religion. Government violates the Free Exercise Clause when it uniquely harms religion by 
creating an exclusive detriment to religion.”). 
 3. “The categorical distinctions that the Court has previously established—speech 
occurring in the public forum versus speech occurring in the nonpublic forum, prior restraints 
versus subsequent punishments, and above all, content-based laws versus content-neutral 
laws—are too rigid to adequately explain the complexity of First Amendment law.” Wilson R. 
Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws that Are Both Content-based and Content-
neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 803 (2004). 
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First Amendment.4 However, rulings in recent years have begun to 
shed some doubt onto this prohibition with regard to schools that 
allow the distribution of similar, nonreligious literature as part of a 
limited public forum.5 Courts have held that school districts with 
limited public forum policies cannot discriminate on the basis of the 
group’s religious message.6 
Less clear is whether these rulings will change the way courts deal 
with the distribution of Bibles by Gideons International.7 For more 
than fifty years, part of the Gideons’ evangelical campaign has been 
the distribution of Bibles in public schools,8 but the courts have an 
equally lengthy history of finding this practice unconstitutional under 
the Establishment Clause.9 Under current case law it appears that a 
school district with a public forum policy could allow the Gideons to 
distribute Bibles with the support of the Free Exercise Clause. 
 
 4. See, e.g., Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that Gideon Bible distribution was unconstitutional). 
 5.  
When the Board acted to eliminate the absolute prohibition on private religious 
literature in the schools, “the Board was not exhibiting any favoritism” for religion in 
general or Christianity in particular, but was simply lifting one forum restriction on 
religious speech to which most other speech had never been subject and thereby 
“permitting the distribution of Bibles and other religious material similar in character 
to material already permitted.”  
Peck v. Upshur County Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 
 Limited public forums are treated differently than traditional forums in that the state’s 
restrictions on speech are subject to stricter scrutiny if it is a traditional forum. Good News Club 
v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001). “When the State establishes a limited public 
forum, the State is not required to and does not allow persons to engage in every type of 
speech.” Id. 
 6. Courts have allowed everything from the distribution of brochures for religious camps 
in Hills v. Scottsdale Unified School District, 329 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2003), to the distribution 
of Bibles in high schools by non-student groups in Peck, 155 F.3d at 274. 
 7. Most Americans are accustomed to finding New Testament tracts provided by 
Gideons International in hotel rooms across the country. Berger, 982 F.2d at 1161–62. The 
Bibles typically provided to public school students by the Gideons contain the entire New 
Testament as well as the books of Proverbs and Psalms. Id. at 1164. The front pages of a 
Gideon Bible typically contain a picture of the American flag and blank lines so that students 
can fill in their names under the phrase “Presented to.” Id. at 1164–65. The goal of Gideons 
International “is ‘to win men and women for the Lord Jesus Christ’” by providing Americans 
with Bibles. Tudor v. Bd. of Educ., 100 A.2d 857, 858 (N.J. 1953) (citation omitted). 
 8. Tudor, 100 A.2d at 858. 
 9. Id. at 868 (“To permit the distribution of the King James version of the Bible in the 
public schools of this State would be to cast aside all the progress made in the United States and 
throughout New Jersey in the field of religious toleration and freedom.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol28/iss1/12
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The conflict between the countervailing interests of the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause with regard to in-
school Bible distribution has been brewing in the court system for 
many years. The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the 
distribution of Gideon Bibles, but its various rulings in other church-
state matters10 have left courts in the position of trying to balance the 
interests protected by the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment 
Clause.11 
These issues have been raised most recently in the case of Doe v. 
South Iron R-1 School District in the Eastern District of Missouri.12 
In South Iron, the school district claims that because it has an open 
forum policy, it cannot prevent the Gideons from distributing Bibles 
in the school without violating the Free Exercise Clause.13 Judgments 
on the federal constitutional issues have gone against the school 
district, largely because the court has been reluctant to accept that the 
district actually has a public forum in place.14 Still, the case raises an 
 
 10. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that a public university may not 
deny a student group access to campus facilities based on its religious content). See generally 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (establishing a three-part test for First Amendment 
religion issues, indicating that in order to avoid conflict with the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment, the statute must have secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect 
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster excessive 
government entanglement with religion).  
 11. See generally Berger, 982 F.2d at 1160 (holding that distribution of Bibles is 
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause and Gideons do not have a free speech right to 
distribute Bibles in schools under the Free Exercise Clause). But see Peck, 155 F.3d at 274 
(holding that distribution of Bibles in common areas of a high school as part of a neutral 
literature distribution policy in accordance with the Free Exercise Clause did not violate the 
Establishment Clause). 
 12. Doe v. S. Iron R-1 Sch. Dist., 453 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (E.D. Mo. 2006), aff’d, 498 F.3d 
878 (8th Cir. 2007). Judge Catherine Perry of the Eastern District of Missouri entered partial 
summary judgment on behalf of the plaintiffs on January 8, 2008, with regard to the First 
Amendment issues. Roark v. S. Iron R-1 Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 323173, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 
2008).  
 13. The South Iron R-1 School District has allowed Gideons to distribute Bibles to fifth 
graders during class for many years. Doe, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 1095. Two parents of elementary 
students brought suit to enjoin this distribution. Id. at 1094. The district had no previous open 
forum policy in place but adopted a new policy ten days before the preliminary injunction 
hearing that allowed outside groups to distribute printed material to students. Id. at 1095–96. 
 14. From the beginning, the court was skeptical of whether the school board would follow 
its new open forum policy because of the district’s history:  
As the Board meeting minutes indicate, when Superintendent Lewis suggested that the 
Board adopt an open forum policy in the spring of 2005, the Board rejected this 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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important question: If a public elementary school did adopt a limited 
public forum, could the Gideons’ activities fall in the gap between the 
two religion clauses of the First Amendment? 
The critical issue is whether Gideon Bibles can be distributed as 
part of a public forum, which requires a different degree of scrutiny 
with respect to viewpoint neutrality.15 Any school policy that grants 
specific accommodations to the Gideons should be found 
unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause. However, there may 
be some situations where the Bibles can be legally distributed in a 
public forum. In fact, failure to allow such distribution because of its 
religious content could amount to a Free Exercise Clause violation. 
The characteristics of such a public forum policy are (1) the 
distribution occurs outside the classroom; (2) no school officials 
actively participate in the distribution; and (3) other, similar types of 
speech are also permitted. This third point is most important; if at any 
time the Gideons control the public forum to the point that the policy 
seems to be a demonstration of approval, the school has violated the 
Establishment Clause.16 
Some will contend that the distribution of Bibles in public schools 
is outside the scope of a public forum policy because Bibles are 
religious literature.17 While that may be true in principle, such a 
 
proposition and voted “to pretend like this meeting never happened.” There was no 
further discussion of the “open forum” policy in the Board meetings until after this 
lawsuit was filed.  
Id. at 1098 (citation omitted). 
 The evidence of the board’s unwillingness to embrace an open forum policy continued to 
mount as the court considered motions for summary judgment. After the close of discovery and 
after parties briefed summary judgment motions, the board amended its policy again on August 
7, 2006. Roark, 2008 WL 323173, at *5. The new policy prohibits the distribution of literature 
by any school official. Id. However, “[t]he School Board defendants may have voted to pass the 
new policy, but there is absolutely no indication that they did so because they realized that their 
old practice was flawed and possibly unconstitutional.” Id. at *7.  
 15. “Different kinds of government involvement—(1) namely occasions in which 
government has provided a forum for private speech and (2) occasions in which government 
has elected to regulate private speech—require different degrees of scrutiny with respect to 
viewpoint neutrality.” Manns, supra note 2, at 679. 
 16. Peck, 155 F.3d at 285 (holding that domination of a public forum by a certain 
religious group can amount to an endorsement of religion in violation of the Establishment 
Clause). 
 17. The court in South Iron stated in its preliminary injunction order that, “Bibles are 
different. Bibles are religious literature and many Christians believe that they contain the word 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol28/iss1/12
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rationale puts the courts in the position of determining which 
religious texts rise to the level of sacred religious speech. If the First 
Amendment means anything, it is that the government should not be 
meddling in the personal lives of citizens by deciding whether certain 
literature amounts to fundamental religious speech.18 
Part I of this Note will explain the history of First Amendment 
jurisprudence as it relates to the distribution of Gideon Bibles and 
other religious materials in public schools. Part II will discuss 
whether the courts were correct in their previous bans on Gideon 
Bible distribution and consider whether any different conclusion is 
necessary when schools have a limited public forum policy in place. 
Finally, Part III will propose guidelines for dealing with Gideon 
Bible distribution at public forum schools in the future, including an 
assessment of the South Iron case. 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETING FIRST AMENDMENT 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Although the First Amendment does not explicitly mandate a 
separation of church and state,19 the Supreme Court has long held that 
 
of God. Bibles do not advertise club meetings or summer camps. The audience for a Bible is the 
person receiving one.” Doe, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 1101. This was the basis for the court’s 
argument that in-school distribution of Bibles would be unconstitutional in an elementary 
school even if the school had an open forum policy because Bibles are clearly different from 
other literature. The school district argued that Bibles should be allowed under the same 
rationale that some courts have used to allow the distribution of religious flyers in elementary 
schools and even Bible distribution in high schools. Id. at 1100–01. 
 18. As eloquently stated by Justice Black, “The Establishment Clause thus stands as an 
expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution that religion is too 
personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.” 
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431–32 (1962). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”).  
 Although the First Amendment applies only to the federal government, the Establishment 
Clause and Free Exercise Clause are operative against the states under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). See Engle, 370 U.S. at 430 (“Under [the 
First] Amendment’s prohibition against governmental establishment of religion, as reinforced 
by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, government in this country, be it state or 
federal, is without power to prescribe by law any particular form of prayer which is to be used 
as an official prayer in carrying on any program of governmentally sponsored religious 
activity.”). 
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the Establishment Clause serves this purpose.20 Historically, in order 
to avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause, the statute or 
government decision in question must pass the three-part test outlined 
in Lemon v. Kurtzman.21 Under that test, it must (1) have a secular 
purpose; (2) neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) foster no 
excessive government entanglement with religion.22  
Although the First Amendment refers specifically to the passage 
of laws restricting religious freedoms or establishing religion, the 
Supreme Court held in Lee v. Weisman that when in-school religious 
activities are conducted or condoned by a public official, it amounts 
to a constitutional violation.23 In some such cases, the religious 
activity has been deemed so pervasive that it is unconstitutional on its 
face, even without a Lemon inquiry.24 The Court reasons that “there 
are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from 
subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public 
 
 20. “In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was 
intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between Church and State.’” Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 
330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). 
 The Court reasoned that the adoption of the First Amendment, in which Thomas Jefferson 
and James Madison played leading roles, was based on the same principles as the famous 
Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty that had been written to separate church and state in 
Virginia. Id. at 11–12. Jefferson and Madison also played pivotal roles in the creation of that 
document. Id. 
 The more controversial issue seems to be whether this wall is crumbling. After seemingly 
every Supreme Court decision dealing with a church-state issue, pundits weigh in on whether 
the new case law buttressed the separation of church and state or eroded Jefferson’s so-called 
“wall of separation.” See, e.g., Mary Leonard, Supreme Court’s Rulings Weaken Church-State 
Wall, B. GLOBE, June 17, 2001, at A16 (arguing that a case forbidding a school from 
discriminating against a religious club regarding the use of facilities was nothing more than an 
alternative way to reintroduce religion to elementary schools); William Van Alstyne, Trends in 
the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson’s Crumbling Wall—A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 
DUKE L.J. 770 (1984) (arguing that a case sustaining a municipal nativity display against a 
constitutional challenge illustrated the government’s increasing affiliation with religion). 
 21. 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
 22. Id. 
 23. 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (“A school official, the principal, decided that an invocation 
and a benediction should be given; this is a choice attributable to the State, and from a 
constitutional perspective it is as if a state statute decreed that the prayers must occur.”). 
 24. Id. In Lee, a religious official delivered a prayer during a middle school graduation 
ceremony. The Court held that “[t]he government involvement with religious activity in this 
case is pervasive, to the point of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise 
in a public school.” Id. See also Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160, 1171 
(7th Cir. 1993) (holding the practice of Bible distribution unconstitutional under the notion of 
pervasiveness in Lee without relying on the structure of Lemon). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol28/iss1/12
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schools.”25 Also, a school cannot escape liability by ceasing in-school 
religious activities when a suit is filed.26 
A. Schools May Not Give Preferential Treatment to Bible 
Distribution 
Based on the Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment, lower 
courts have held almost unanimously that it is unconstitutional for 
public school officials to give preferential access to the Gideons for 
the purpose of Bible distribution.27 One rationale for outlawing the 
distribution of Bibles has been to preserve the right of parents to 
direct the religious upbringing of their children.28 Other rationales are 
based on the Lemon criteria. Courts have held that there is no 
conceivable secular purpose associated with in-school Bible 
distribution.29 In determining secular purpose, it is appropriate to ask 
“whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of 
religion.”30 The Supreme Court has rejected the idea that promotion 
of moral values can be secular.31 
Another issue the courts have addressed is whether Gideon Bible 
distribution creates an excessive government entanglement with 
 
 25. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592. 
 26. Meltzer v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 548 F.2d 559, 566 n.10 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[M]ere 
voluntary cessation of misconduct when a suit is filed does not necessarily render a case moot 
or remove the necessary justiciability.”). 
 27. Marc D. Stern, Religion and the Public Schools: A Summary of the Law February 
2006 Update, in SIXTH ANNUAL SCHOOL LAW INSTITUTE 7, 26 (PLI/NY, Course Handbook 
Series No. F-160, 2006). 
 28. Brown v. Orange County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 128 So. 2d 181, 185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1960) (“The right of the parent to teach his own faith to his child, or to teach him no 
religion at all is one of the foundations of our way of life and enjoys full constitutional 
protection.”) (quoting Schempp v. Sch. Dist., 177 F. Supp. 398, 407 (D.C. Pa. 1959)). 
 This concern can be traced to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510 (1925), where it held, “The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who 
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and 
prepare him for additional obligations.” Id. at 535. 
 29. Jabr v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 171 F. Supp. 2d 653, 660 (W.D. La. 2001) (holding 
that a principal who distributed New Testament Bibles to fifth graders in his office had no 
secular purpose). 
 30. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (holding an Alabama school prayer and 
meditation statute unconstitutional because it had no secular purpose). 
 31. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963) (“[E]ven if its purpose is not strictly 
religious, it is sought to be accomplished through readings, without comment, from the Bible. 
Surely the place of the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid . . . .”). 
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religion. In Tudor v. Board of Education,32 a public school board 
passed a resolution that allowed the Gideons to distribute Bibles in 
schools at the close of the day to students whose parents had signed 
permission slips.33 The court held that even this would be viewed as 
an entanglement with religion.34  
Finally, courts have outlawed Bible distribution as a state effort to 
advance Christianity at the expense of other religions.35 Young 
students cannot be expected to make the subtle distinctions between 
instructors invited by the school and those who come of their own 
accord.36 In instances where Gideons have been allowed to distribute 
Bibles in school, it would be naïve to believe that the school 
administration was neither involved nor interested in getting each 
student a New Testament Bible.37 
Some proponents of Bible distribution have tried to argue that 
Gideons have a free speech right to distribute Bibles in school, but 
this notion has been rejected by the courts.38 In Berger v. Rensselaer 
Central School Corp., the school district argued that (1) school 
personnel were not involved in the Bible distribution, and (2) the 
school had a public forum policy.39 The court dismissed this 
argument as a “definitional coup,”40 pointing out that “[a] public 
 
 32. 100 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1953). 
 33. Id. at 858–59. 
 34. “In the eyes of the pupils and their parents the board of education has placed its stamp 
of approval upon this distribution and, in fact, upon the Gideon Bible itself.” Id. at 868.  
 35. “‘[A] government may not demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or creed 
(including a preference for Christianity over other religions).’ Nothing could be more 
unabashedly Christian than the New Testament Bibles.” Jabr v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 171 F. 
Supp. 2d 653, 660 (W.D. La. 2001) (citation omitted). 
 36. Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160, 1166 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 37. “[T]he image of hundreds of students being marched into an auditorium for the yearly 
distribution of Bibles cannot but leave the imprimatur of state involvement.” Id. 
 38. Id. at 1165. 
 39. Id. at 1165–67. The school district argued that it was merely a neutral conduit of ideas. 
Id. at 1165. However, the facts did not support this assertion. Bibles were distributed for 
decades in the presence of teachers, and students were instructed to return the Bibles to their 
teachers if they did not want them. Id. at 1165–66. Also, the record revealed no regular talks or 
literature distribution by any group other than the Gideons. Id. at 1166. 
 40. Id. at 1165 (holding that the free speech argument “distorts the facts and misconstrues 
the law”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol28/iss1/12
P 403 Clark book pages  10/31/2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008]  Filling the First Amendment Gap 411 
 
 
school cannot sanitize an endorsement of religion forbidden under the 
Establishment Clause by also sponsoring non-religious speech.”41 
B. Schools with Public Forums May Not Discriminate on the Basis of 
Religious Content 
Even as courts were outlawing Bible distribution on 
Establishment Clause grounds, a separate line of cases established the 
doctrine that public schools could not deny access to a group or 
writing on the basis of its religious content without violating the Free 
Exercise Clause.42 Such a distinction would amount to viewpoint-
based discrimination.43 Widmar v. Vincent,44 the leading case in this 
area, held that “[i]n order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a 
public forum based on the religious content of a group's intended 
speech, the [school] must therefore satisfy the standard of review 
appropriate to content-based exclusions.”45 Once a school has created 
a public forum policy, it can only deviate from that policy if the 
viewpoint-based regulation serves a compelling government interest 
and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.46 
 
 41. Id. at 1168. The court also noted that “it is clear that Rensselaer schools—despite the 
open policy—were not overrun with members of other religions vying for the students’ 
faith. . . . [T]he salient point here is that Rensselaer school classrooms were not, in fact, open 
and active fora for competing ideas, contrary to assertions by the Corporation.” Id. at 1166. 
 42. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (holding that a public 
university cannot withhold funding from a student group because of the religious nature of the 
group’s message). See generally Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 
U.S. 384, 394 (1993) (“[T]he government violates the First Amendment when it denies access 
to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible 
subject.”) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)). 
 43. “It is as objectionable to exclude both a theistic and an atheistic perspective on the 
debate as it is to exclude one, the other, or yet another political, economic, or social viewpoint.” 
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831. 
 44. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 45. Id. at 269–70. In Widmar, members of a religious group at a state university brought 
an action challenging the university’s policy of excluding religious groups from its open forum 
policy that made campus facilities available to students. Id. at 264–65. This notion was codified 
in the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071–74 (2000), which provides that no school that 
receives federal funding and has a public forum policy can deny access to a student group on 
the basis of religious content. Id. § 4071(a). The law defines a limited public forum as any time 
a public school has granted “an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum 
related student groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time.” Id. § 4071(b). 
 46. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270. The Court held that the school’s interest in complying with 
the Establishment Clause was indeed a compelling interest, but an equal access policy would 
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Courts have applied this viewpoint-discrimination test to religious 
expression in public elementary schools.47 In Hills v. Scottsdale 
Unified School District,48 the Ninth Circuit considered the 
constitutionality of a literature distribution program that prohibited 
literature of a religious nature.49 The court found that the policy 
amounted to a limited public forum, and therefore the school district 
engaged in viewpoint discrimination by refusing to allow the 
distribution of religious literature.50 In essence, the courts have 
determined that the danger that children will misperceive the 
endorsement of religion is no greater than the risk they will perceive 
a hostility toward religion if the religious expression is excluded.51 
 
not be incompatible with the First Amendment. Id. at 270–71. 
 47. In Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001), the school district 
had opened its limited public forum for events “pertaining to the welfare of the community.” Id. 
at 108. While finding that teaching morals and character development to children is a legitimate 
government interest, the Court held that a school’s exclusion of a Christian children’s club from 
meeting after hours at the school based on its religious nature was unconstitutional viewpoint 
discrimination. Id. at 108–09. The Good News Club could not be excluded simply for 
addressing morals and character development from a religious perspective. Id. at 110. 
 48. 329 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 49. Id. at 1046. The stated purpose of the open forum policy was to serve as a community 
service to students and their parents by letting them know about community events: summer 
camps, art classes, or scouting activities, for example. Id. at 1047. The plaintiff in this case ran a 
Christian summer camp and sought to have his brochures distributed by the school. Id. at 1047–
48. When he was denied access to the forum based on the religious content of his brochures, he 
brought suit. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1050 (“Restrictions on speech in the context of a limited public forum must be 
both viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.”). 
 There was no risk in this case of an Establishment Clause violation because the brochures 
were not integrated into the curriculum, the events were not school-sponsored, the camp did not 
take place on school grounds, and the ultimate decision on whether the child would attend the 
camp was left up to the parents. Id. at 1054–56. The court also addressed the value of teaching 
students about the First Amendment: “[T]he desirable approach is not for schools to throw up 
their hands because of the possible misconceptions about endorsement of religion, but that 
instead it is ‘[f]ar better to teach [students] about the First Amendment, about the difference 
between private and public action, about why we tolerate divergent views.’” Id. at 1055 
(quoting Hedges v. Wauonda Cmty. United Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295, 1299–1300 (7th 
Cir. 1993)). 
 However, the court did consider the possibility that religious groups might take advantage 
of the literature distribution policy in an attempt to proselytize. “[T]he District is not obligated 
to distribute material that, in the guise of announcing an event, contains direct exhortations to 
religious observance; this exceeds the purpose of the forum the District created.” Id. at 1053. 
 51. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. at 118. “We decline to employ Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence using a modified heckler’s veto, in which a group’s religious activity can be 
proscribed on the basis of what the youngest members of the audience might misperceive.” Id. 
at 119. 
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C. Filling the Gap: The Collision of Free Exercise Clause and 
Establishment Clause Concerns in Schools with Public Forums 
The issue of religious literature distribution in public schools with 
open forum policies brings the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Establishment Clause into tension with one another.52 The Supreme 
Court has addressed this tension by pointing out a gap between the 
two: “Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is 
room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality 
which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and 
without interference.”53 It is within this gap that courts have 
identified limited situations where religious literature distribution 
might be constitutionally acceptable. 
The Fourth Circuit used the viewpoint-discrimination standard to 
erode the clear prohibition on the in-school Bible distribution by non-
students in Peck v. Upshur County Board of Education.54 In Peck, the 
school district had a long-standing policy of allowing non-student, 
private groups to distribute literature in public schools.55 Under this 
policy, the district allowed a local religious group to distribute Bibles 
in the school, but placed strict requirements on the time, place and 
manner of the distribution to ensure that the group received no 
preferential treatment.56 The Fourth Circuit held that this practice did 
 
 52. This is not, by any means, the only issue that creates this tension. Consider, for 
example, the issue of legislative prayer: “[L]egislative prayer is permissible under the 
Establishment Clause; however, someone cannot demand, on the strength of the Free Exercise 
Clause, that a legislature support such prayers.” Alan Trammell, The Cabining of Rosenberger: 
Locke v. Davey and the Broad Nondiscrimination Principle that Never Was, 92 VA. L. REV. 
1957, 1959 (2006). 
 53. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). See also Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 
712, 719 (2004) (“[T]here are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not 
required by the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
 54. 155 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 55. Typical groups who were granted access to the schools included Little League, Boy 
Scouts, Girl Scouts, 4-H, and the Women’s Christian Temperance Union. Id. at 275. The 
board’s written policy had historically denied access to groups wishing to distribute religious or 
political literature, but at the request of a local religious group, the board held the policy to 
allow the passive distribution of such materials in schools. Id. 
 56. The school’s limitations on Bible distribution were quite extensive. The Bibles were 
to be made available on a single day in a common area of the school and any remaining Bibles 
were to be removed at the end of the day. Id. at 277. No school personnel was to be involved in 
setting up the table and no one was allowed to stand by the table and encourage students to take 
a Bible; there was only to be a sign saying “Please feel free to take one.” Id. The school also 
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not violate the Establishment Clause because “it was plainly adopted, 
not to advance religion, but for the secular purpose of ‘open[ing] a 
forum for speech.’”57 The court also dispatched with concerns about 
the coercive power of school endorsement, pointing out that “schools 
do not endorse everything they fail to censor.”58 
Some other circuits have embraced the Fourth Circuit’s rationale 
in Peck over the last decade.59 These opinions rely heavily on the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Good News Club v. Milford Central 
School,60 pointing out that “the Court has never ruled that a school's 
practice might amount to an impermissible endorsement of religion 
because of the impressionability of the school's young students.”61  
 
made it clear that any materials representing other religious beliefs would be given the same 
treatment if the school was asked to distribute them. Id. 
 57. Id. at 279 (citation omitted). 
 58. Id. at 283 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)). However, the 
court did acknowledge that a different standard may apply to elementary schools, where the 
concerns regarding coercion are more pronounced. “[W]e are convinced that a majority of the 
Supreme Court might well believe that these concerns should be and are sufficient in the 
elementary school context to invalidate such a policy.” Id. at 288 n.*. 
 59. See generally Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 
386 F.3d 514 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a school would not violate the Establishment Clause 
if it allowed a religious organization access to a limited public forum); Rusk v. Crestview Local 
Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 418 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that distribution of religious flyers did not 
constitute endorsement of religion by school, as would violate the Establishment Clause). 
 While embracing the Fourth Circuit’s rationale in Peck, the Sixth Circuit in Rusk disagreed 
with the Fourth Circuit’s assertion that the same reasoning does not apply to elementary 
schools. Rusk, 379 F.3d at 424. The Sixth Circuit observed that Peck was decided before 
Milford, in which the Supreme Court rejected “the age and impressionability of elementary 
school students as grounds for ruling that allowing a religious club to meet in school classrooms 
would violate the Establishment Clause.” Id. 
 60. 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 61. Rusk, 379 F.3d at 421. In fact, at least one medical expert has testified that in order for 
young children to perceive an endorsement of religion, they would need to witness direct 
actions or statements of endorsement by school officials. Child psychiatrist Peter Fink testified 
on behalf of a school district at the trial in Sherman v. Community Consolidated School District 
21, No. 92 C 6674, 1993 WL 57522 (N.D. Ill. 1993), aff’d, 8 F.3d 1160 (7th Cir. 1993). He 
contended that children of “Cub Scout age . . . don’t get into the subtleties of abstraction unless 
there are literal and direct behaviors or statements made by individuals.” Id. at *6. Although 
that case involved a challenge to the school’s pledge of allegiance policy rather than school 
prayer, the court was forced to confront similar issues of peer coercion and state endorsement. It 
determined that while peer pressure from fellow students will likely exist in any school 
environment, there is practically no risk of state coercion when the activities take place outside 
the classroom and school officials are not directly involved. Dan Mbulu, First Amendment: 
Extending Equal Access to Elementary Education in the Aftermath of Good News Club v. 
Milford Central School, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 91, 111 (2003–2004). 
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D. Defining Religious Literature 
A key element of this discussion is whether certain forms of 
religious speech pose a greater threat to the Establishment Clause 
than others. Although there has been no debate regarding whether 
Gideon Bibles are religious by nature,62 courts have been less clear in 
whether Bibles deserve a different level of First Amendment 
protection than other forms of religious literature. In the South Iron 
preliminary injunction order, the court suggested that there is a 
fundamental difference between religious flyers and the Bible 
because many people accept the Bible as the word of God.63 This 
stance is supported in Hills, where the Ninth Circuit held that 
although flyers for religious camps could not be excluded under the 
district’s public forum policy, Bibles could be.64 The distinction 
seems to turn on the definition of religion, which the Ninth Circuit 
argued is generally a common term that is sufficiently clear to 
persons of ordinary intelligence.65 
However, the Supreme Court has held that an individual’s 
understanding of religion cannot be put on trial in First Amendment 
cases.66 Banning a certain type of literature from a public forum 
 
 62. See Tudor v. Bd. of Educ., 100 A.2d 857, 866 (N.J. 1953) (holding that the Gideon 
Bible is a sectarian book). See also Goodwin v. Cross County Sch. Dist. No. 7, 394 F. Supp. 
417, 428 (D.C. Ark. 1973) (holding that Gideon Bible distribution is an exercise of religious 
character). 
 63. See supra note 17. The court reinforced this notion in its summary judgment order, 
stating that “common sense tells us that a flyer advertising a church camp is different from a 
Bible. A person need only read the Bible to be confronted with a religious viewpoint, but 
reading a flyer does not have the same effect—the flyer requires a person to take follow-up 
action.” Roark v. S. Iron R-1 Sch. Dist., No. 4:06 CV 392 CDP, 2008 WL 323173, at *15 (E.D. 
Mo. Jan. 8, 2008). 
 64. Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 1044, 1053 (9th Cir. 2003). The court 
held that the limited public forum was never opened for pure discourse and as such, the district 
would be well within its rights to exclude a religious tract—such as the Gideon Bible—that was 
aimed at converting students to a particular belief. Id. The court also pointed out that the 
brochures themselves could cross that line if they stated: “Did you know that if a child does not 
come to the knowledge of JESUS CHRIST, and learn the importance of Bible reading by age 
12, chances are slim that they ever will in this life? We think it is important to start as young as 
possible!” Id. at 1052–53. 
 65. Id. at 1056. 
 66. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (“If one could be sent to jail because 
a jury in a hostile environment found those teachings false, little indeed would be left of 
religious freedom.”). See also Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 
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because it is deemed “religious” is viewpoint-based discrimination. 
Because free speech includes the right to distribute literature, a public 
forum policy cannot include a content-based restriction on literature 
distribution unless it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
state interest.67 The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of 
the provisions of the Equal Access Act prohibiting schools with 
public forum policies from discriminating on the basis of content 
defined as religious,68 and therefore the Court has implied that 
complying with the Establishment Clause is not a sufficiently 
compelling interest to regulate speech on the basis of religious 
content in an open forum.69 Furthermore, a school board cannot be 
placed in a position of determining what constitutes orthodox 
religious material.70 
II. TWO RIGHT ANSWERS: DO BIBLE DISTRIBUTION BANS AND 
PUBLIC FORUM POLICIES BOTH ACCOUNT FOR THE STANDARDS 
ESTABLISHED IN LEMON AND LEE? 
In analyzing any First Amendment religion issue, it is important to 
consider whether lower court decisions are in accord with the 
Supreme Court mandates set forth in Lemon and Lee. As recently as 
the early 1990s, the Supreme Court spurned the invitations of many 
to scrap the Lemon test, so its three-prong approach remains the 
 
707, 714 (1981) (“[R]religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or 
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”). 
 67. Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1381–82 (1990). 
 68. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (holding that the Act’s purpose was not to 
“endorse or disapprove of religion”). 
 69. See Eugene C. Bjorklun, Distribution of Religious Literature in the Public Schools, 68 
EDUC. L. REP. 957, 960 (1991). The author argues that the implication of Mergens is that the 
unimpeded distribution of religious literature must be allowed in any context where the 
distribution of secular literature is allowed. See id. 
 70. In Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 457 
U.S. 853 (1982), a majority of the Supreme Court held that defendant school board was not 
entitled to summary judgment on a claim that it had reached beyond its constitutional discretion 
in removing certain books from the school libraries. Id. at 872. In the plurality opinion, Justice 
Brennan wrote that “local school boards may not remove books from school library shelves 
simply because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their removal to 
‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion.’” Id. (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). 
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governing law.71 However, courts can also rely on Lee to reject any 
religious activity that is so pervasive as to constitute a state-
sponsored religious activity.72  
A. Bible Distribution Bans vs. Lemon 
Decisions in the wake of Lemon that have banned Bible 
distribution in public schools without public forum policies have 
consistently applied the three-part test.73 The courts that have banned 
Gideon Bible distribution in schools without public forum policies 
have decided these cases correctly for three reasons: (1) the inherent 
pressure to accept Bibles; (2) the infringement on parental rights; and 
(3) the appearance of preferential treatment for Christianity. First, 
children in schools where Bibles are distributed during the day will 
likely feel coerced to participate in religious activity if the majority of 
their peers are receiving Bibles.74 This is the very essence of the 
alternate Establishment Clause test that the Supreme Court applied in 
Lee.75 Even if children are given an alternative to accepting the 
Bibles, it is unrealistic to expect children in the middle of a classroom 
setting to decline the Bibles.76 Although students might technically 
have the ability to refuse the Bibles—just as the students in Lee could 
 
 71. Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160, 1169 (7th Cir. 1993). The 
Seventh Circuit points out that although the Court in Lee refrained from overruling the Lemon 
approach, that case was resolved without reference to the three-prong test. Id. 
 72. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
 73. See Jabr v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 171 F. Supp. 2d 653, 659–61 (W.D. La. 2001) 
(holding that a district policy allowing a principal to distribute Bibles in his office violated all 
three prongs of the Lemon test). See also Meltzer v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 548 F.2d 559, 577–
79 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that a board resolution allowing Bible distribution was inconsistent 
with Lemon because it lacked a secular purpose and the primary effect of the statute was to 
advance religion); Berger, 982 F.2d at 1171 (holding that a Bible distribution policy advances 
the Gideons’ beliefs and entangles the government in religion). 
 74. Tudor v. Bd. of Educ., 100 A.2d 857, 866 (N.J. 1954) (“The law of imitation operates, 
the non-conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children. The result is obvious 
pressure upon children to attend.”) (quoting Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 
203, 227 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 75. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (“It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution 
guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its 
exercise . . . .”). 
 76. “That a child is offered an alternative may reduce the constraint; it does not eliminate 
the operation of influence by the school in matters sacred to conscience and outside the school’s 
domain.” McCollum, 333 U.S. at 227. 
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technically walk out of the graduation ceremony to avoid a 
prayer77—the First Amendment “prohibits the government from 
putting children in this difficult position.”78 
The distribution of Gideon Bibles also robs parents of their right 
to direct the religious upbringing of their children, whether that 
means teaching a certain faith to their children or teaching their 
children no faith at all.79 “If the faith of a child is developed 
inconsistently with the faith of the parent and contrary to the wishes 
of the parent, interference with the familial right of the parent to 
inculcate in the child the religion the parent desires, is clear beyond 
doubt.”80 
Finally, regardless of the school board’s intent, it is clear that a 
policy allowing the distribution of Bibles in the absence of other 
literature distribution places a stamp of approval on the Gideon 
version of the Bible.81 Elementary school students should not be 
expected to distinguish between speakers invited by the schools and 
those whose visit is self-initiated, even when they are told how the 
distributors arrived at the school.82 
B. Public Forum Policies vs. Lemon 
The dangers presented by Bible distribution are eliminated when 
Bibles are distributed merely as part of a limited public forum policy. 
Cases that have allowed the distribution of religious materials in 
public schools with open forum policies have also carefully applied 
 
 77. Lee, 505 U.S. at 594–95. In Lee, the school district argued that a prayer held by a 
Rabbi during a graduation ceremony could not be considered an inducement to religion because 
the ceremony was optional and students could therefore choose not to attend if they opposed the 
prayer. Id. The Court rejected this argument, holding that “[e]veryone knows that in our society 
and in our culture high school graduation is one of life’s most significant occasions.” Id. at 595. 
 78. Berger, 982 F.2d at 1170. 
 79. See Brown v. Orange County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 128 So. 2d 181, 185 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1960). 
 80. Id. at 184. 
 81. Meltzer v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 548 F.2d 559, 576 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he school 
board’s use of the school system as a means of distribution amounts to its placing, at least in the 
eyes of children and perhaps their parents, its stamp of approval upon the Gideon version of the 
Bible, thus creating an unconstitutional preference for one religion over another.”). 
 82. Berger, 982 F.2d at 1166. 
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the Lemon criteria.83 Courts have correctly held that open forum 
policies in public schools usually stem from a secular purpose.84 In 
fact, the Supreme Court has held that public forum policies that 
include nondiscrimination against religion have an inherent secular 
purpose and do not amount to government entanglement with 
religion.85 
The hardest inquiry for these policies to overcome is whether the 
primary effect of the policy advances or inhibits religion. Simply 
because an organization enjoys merely incidental benefits of a public 
forum policy does not mean that policy is a primary advancement of 
religion.86 “[I]t is well established that ‘schools do not endorse 
everything they fail to censor.’”87 Courts have held that even when a 
religious group does receive incidental benefits from an open forum 
policy, there is no realistic danger that the community will see it as an 
endorsement of religion.88 
Finally, well-drafted public forum policies limit the coercive 
dangers addressed by the Court in Lee.89 While the possibility of 
student pressure might still exist, the characteristics of a properly 
implemented limited public forum reduce the risk of official coercion 
because the distribution takes place outside the classroom setting and 
school officials are not involved.90 The Supreme Court has held that 
 
 83. See, e.g., Peck v. Upshur County Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that the school board’s policy was adopted not to advance religion but for the secular 
purpose of opening a forum of speech to advance the school’s educational mission). 
 84. In Peck, the court found that the school board’s express purpose for creating an open 
forum policy was to allow private speakers to enhance education by exposing students to a 
broad range of ideas. Id. 
 85. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271–72 (1981). 
 86. Id. at 273. The Court held that the religious group in this case enjoyed merely 
incidental benefits because the policy no more committed the university to the goals of religion 
than it did to the goals of any other secular student group. Id. at 274. Also, there were more than 
one hundred groups recognized by the university, the majority of which were not religious. Id. 
 87. Peck, 155 F.3d at 283 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 
U.S. 226, 250 (1990)). The court relied on Mergens in stating that this proposition is true even 
when the limited public forum is meant to help shape the character of students. Id. 
 88. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993) 
(holding that the risk of community misperception was low because the school had also been 
used by a number of nonreligious private organizations). 
 89. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (“[T]here are heightened concerns with 
protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and 
secondary public schools.”). 
 90. Peck, 155 F.3d at 287. The court also specifically addressed the concerns raised in 
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it “cannot say the danger that children would misperceive the 
endorsement of religion is any greater than the danger that they 
would perceive hostility toward the religious viewpoint if the 
[religious group] were excluded from the public forum.”91 The state’s 
coercive power over children will play a role in their perception of 
religion regardless of officials’ decision to allow religious activity in 
the school. Thus, it is better to allow the speech as part of the limited 
public forum and then educate the students about the First 
Amendment.92 
III. PLAY IN THE JOINTS: FINDING A MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN THE 
ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE EXERCISE CLAUSES IN GIDEON CASES 
Most instances of Gideon Bible distribution would still amount to 
violations of the Establishment Clause. However, Supreme Court 
rulings over the last two decades have carved out an exception to the 
once-categorical ban on such distribution in public schools.93 In very 
limited situations, the Gideons may be allowed to distribute Bibles. 
This will occur only when there is a true limited public forum: (1) 
distribution takes place outside the classroom; (2) no school 
 
Lee, saying that “no student will be put to the choice of ‘participating [in a religious exercise], 
with all that implies, or protesting.’” Id. (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 593). 
 91. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 118 (2001). 
 92. Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The 
school’s proper response is to educate the audience rather than squelch the speaker. Schools 
may explain that they do not endorse speech by permitting it. If pupils do not comprehend so 
simple a lesson, then one wonders whether the [ ] schools can teach anything at all.”) (quoting 
Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295, 1299–1300 (7th Cir. 1933)) 
(alteration in original). 
 93. The Supreme Court still has not directly addressed the distribution of Gideon Bibles in 
public schools. However, its holdings relating to the Equal Access Act and the availability of 
public schools for use by religious groups have implied that there may be a place for religious 
literature in a limited public forum. See Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. at 112 (holding that a 
school’s exclusion of a Christian club was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination). See also 
Bd. of Educ. Of Westside Cmty. Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, at 253 (1990) (holding that 
the Equal Access Act was constitutional).  
 Lower courts have relied on these precedents to allow religious literature distribution. See 
Rusk v. Crestview Local Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 418, 422–23 (6th Cir. 2004) (relying on Milford 
and Mergens in holding that distribution of flyers did not constitute endorsement of religion by 
the school). See also Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 
F.3d 514, 531 (3d Cir. 2004) (relying on Milford and Mergens in holding that granting equal 
access to public facilities does not offend the Establishment Clause). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol28/iss1/12
P 403 Clark book pages  10/31/2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008]  Filling the First Amendment Gap 421 
 
 
personnel are present; and (3) other, similar types of speech are also 
permitted.94 
Applying this standard to the South Iron case study, it seems clear 
that a variation on the school’s new policy95 would be constitutional 
if it had been in place and utilized by other private groups.96 
However, the fact that the policy was designed specifically for the 
Gideons means that it fails the third prong of the proposed test.97 In 
that respect, the court was correct in its decision to issue a 
preliminary injunction against the distribution of Gideon Bibles and a 
partial summary judgment order for the plaintiffs. 
The court in South Iron also contended that the policy would be 
unconstitutional regardless of when it was enacted, because 
“[d]istinguishing Bibles from flyers . . . does not require drawing a 
line that has not been drawn before.”98 The problem with this 
perspective is that while it addresses the Establishment Clause 
concerns, it fails to balance these interests with the competing Free 
 
 94. This third point is particularly important. In Peck, the Fourth Circuit noted Justice 
O’Connor’s suggestion that “‘a private group may so dominate the forum that a formal policy 
of equal access is transformed into a demonstration of approval,’ and that the resulting 
‘endorsement’ of religion violates the Establishment Clause.” Peck, 155 F.3d at 285 (quoting 
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
 95. The Fourth Circuit in Peck was careful to observe the safeguards put in place by the 
school to prevent the perception of endorsement. These included allowing distribution of 
religious material only once a year, putting signs on the table to disclaim endorsement, and 
exerting no pressure on students (by faculty or others) to take materials. Id. at 287. In its 
summary judgment order, the court in South Iron correctly observed that the district’s so-called 
open forum policy had none of these elements. Roark v. S. Iron R-1 Sch. Dist., No. 4:06 CV 
392 CDP, 2008 WL 323173, at *16–*17 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2008). 
 96. The first policy was implemented just ten days before both the start of the school year 
and the preliminary injunction hearing, so no group had been given an opportunity to utilize the 
policy before the matter was presented in court. Doe v. S. Iron R-1 Sch. Dist., 453 F. Supp. 2d. 
1093, 1095–96 (E.D. Mo. 2006). At the time of the court’s preliminary injunction ruling, no 
requests had been made under the policy, but the court held that “past events show that such a 
request is highly likely to be forthcoming, if not from the Gideons, then from the local 
Ministerial Alliance or a similar group.” Id. at 1099. The district modified its policy again in 
May 2007, apparently attempting to adopt some of the characteristics of the policy in Peck by 
specifically prohibiting school officials from being involved in distribution. Roark, 2008 WL 
323173, at *5. 
 97. The court noted that “the evidence of the School Board’s behavior here raises a very 
strong inference that the purpose of this new policy is to promote Christianity by providing a 
means for Christian Bibles to be distributed to the elementary school students.” Doe, 453 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1102. 
 98. Id. at 1101. 
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Exercise Clause considerations. The court’s assessment puts the court 
itself in the position of defining what constitutes fundamental 
religious speech. Given the Supreme Court’s holdings that state 
actors should not be entitled to define orthodox religion,99 it seems 
counterintuitive to allow the court to do so.100 Such line drawing, 
where the limitations on speech are directly proportional to its level 
of religious content, is the very essence of viewpoint-based 
discrimination under the Free Exercise Clause.101 Distribution of 
religious literature in public schools is either acceptable or it is not; 
the Constitution does not permit a sliding scale based on the religious 
content of the speaker. 
The South Iron court’s reliance on Schempp v. School District, 
and the proposition that “the place of the Bible as an instrument of 
religion cannot be gainsaid”102 is misplaced because the cases are 
factually distinguishable. In Schempp, the school argued that the 
Bible was being used “as an instrument for nonreligious moral 
inspiration or as a reference for the teaching of secular subjects.”103 In 
that context, the obvious religious nature of the Bible cannot—and 
should not—be denied. However, in a true limited public forum as 
described above, there would be no debate about the religious nature 
 
 99. See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 
872 (1982) (holding that any state action taken for the purposes of prescribing orthodox beliefs 
is inescapably condemned by Supreme Court precedent). 
 100. “The determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice is more often than not a 
difficult and delicate task . . . . However, the resolution of that question is not to turn upon a 
judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question. . . .” Thomas v. Review Bd. of 
Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). 
 101. In Rosenberger, the student-publication funding policy in question did not exclude 
religion as a subject matter but disfavored students with religious editorial viewpoints. 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995). The Court held that this was 
viewpoint discrimination because “the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or the 
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the speaker.” Id. at 829. This rationale is 
inconsistent with the court’s argument in South Iron that distributing religious flyers is 
acceptable but distributing Gideon Bibles is not. Banning Gideon Bibles while allowing flyers 
punishes the Gideons because of the specific ideology and viewpoint expressed by the speakers. 
Those who wish to disseminate religious philosophy would be halted while those who wish to 
sell religious instruction would be allowed. 
 102. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963). 
 103. Id. This case was the result of two companion cases (one from Pennsylvania and one 
from Maryland) in which state action required public schools to begin each day with Bible 
readings. Id. at 205. In Pennsylvania, the rule was a state statute, while the Maryland rule was a 
school board decision. Id. at 205, 211. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol28/iss1/12
P 403 Clark book pages  10/31/2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008]  Filling the First Amendment Gap 423 
 
 
of the Bibles—or the Koran or Torah, for that matter—if a group 
chose to distribute those religious texts. Students would be aware that 
the content of the literature was religious, but the safeguards in place 
would ensure that they did not associate that religious message with 
school personnel or the state. In this way, Gideon Bible distribution 
could fall within the gap between the Free Exercise Clause and 
Establishment Clauses: it would be permitted by the Establishment 
Clause if the school chose to enact a limited public forum policy, but 
schools would be under no obligation from the Free Exercise Clause 
to do so.104 
Allowing Bible distribution in the three-part limited public forum 
framework outlined above would ensure that schools acting in good 
faith to expose students to a diverse set of viewpoints were able to do 
so. But if, as in South Iron, the school district has exhibited a clear 
preference for a particular religious belief,105 courts would be able to 
intervene to limit the Establishment Clause dangers presented by 
such a policy. In all likelihood, a school like South Iron, which seems 
intent on promoting Christianity, would probably choose to end Bible 
distribution if it meant the adoption of a policy that would allow other 
religious texts to be distributed as well. In this way, a limited public 
forum would balance the Establishment Clause rights of the students 
and parents to be free from state-sponsored religious activities with 
the Free Exercise rights of the Gideons to distribute literature in an 
open forum without being subjected to viewpoint discrimination. 
 
 104. In Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004), Chief Justice Rehnquist adopted the Supreme 
Court’s “play in the joints” holding from Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), 
clarifying that “there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not 
required by the Free Exercise Clause.” Id. at 719. While this gap between the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause is largely intuitive, Davey was the first Supreme Court 
case to specifically endorse “play in the joints” as an actual holding. Trammell, supra note 52, 
at 1959. 
 105. In its preliminary injunction order, the district court in South Iron held that, based on 
the undisputed facts in the case and the provided school board minutes, the only conceivable 
purpose for the district’s action was “promotion of Christianity by distributing Bibles to 
elementary school students.” Doe v. S. Iron R-1 Sch. Dist., 453 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1102 (E.D. 
Mo. 2006). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the notion that there is some play in the joints of the 
First Amendment, there may be an opportunity for the Gideons to slip 
into that gap and, in very limited situations, legally distribute Bibles 
in public elementary schools. In order for this to occur, the school in 
question must have an open forum policy in which (1) the 
distribution occurs outside the classroom; (2) no school officials 
actively participate in the distribution; and (3) other, similar types of 
speech are also permitted. This does not mean that the Gideons would 
have a constitutional right to distribution in all elementary schools. 
Only under extremely limited circumstances could Bible distribution 
fall into a gap where it is “permitted by the Establishment Clause, but 
not required by the Free Exercise Clause.”106 The distribution would 
be at the school’s discretion. 
This is not, as some might argue, an erosion of the wall separating 
church and state. Rather, it is an acknowledgement of the competing 
interests embodied by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has 
made it clear that the Free Exercise Clause forbids government 
entities that operate limited public forums from discriminating on the 
basis of religious content in literature distribution. To create a higher 
standard for Bibles would put the Court in the position of creating 
viewpoint-based restrictions based on its understanding of religion, 
thus violating the Establishment Clause.  
In the vast majority of cases, Gideon Bible distribution in public 
schools would still be unconstitutional; for example, the court in 
South Iron was correct to issue a preliminary injunction and partial 
summary judgment order because the evidence indicates that the 
school’s goal in creating its so-called open forum policy was to 
advance the interests of the Gideons. Schools without public forum 
policies, schools that grant access only to the Gideons, or schools that 
enact public forum policies only as a pretext for the advancement of a 
specific religion still violate the Establishment Clause. However, a 
 
 106. Locke, 540 U.S. at 719. 
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blanket ban on in-school Bible distribution does not stand when 
considered in the limited public forum context and in light of the 
Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. 
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